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ABSTRACT
This thesis describes and analyzes how commercial banks
underwrite loans issued in disinvested urban areas using
underwriting criteria which stray from traditional underwriting
criteria. These types of loans are referred to as non-traditional or
community development loans.
Bank lending practices have contributed to disinvestment in certain
inner-city neighborhoods due to lender's perception of higher risk
and lower property values. The shift in bank lending patterns away
from inner-city communities paralleled the decline of the urban
core.
Heightened pressure stemming from federal legislation and public
and private initiatives in Boston to enhance lending opportunities to
lower-income populations, has resulted in greater efforts to provide
credit in Boston's urban neighborhoods. However, increased
regulation of financial institutions has made it difficult to
underwrite non-traditional loans.
Non-traditional lending in Boston will become very difficult in the
1990s. As stricter regulations are imposed on commercial banks,
lenders will lose the flexibility needed to issue these types of loans.
As public sources of financing diminish, the financial viability of
these types of loans will decrease. The city of Boston continues to
demonstrate its commitment to reinvestment through the creation
of programs intended to combine public and private expertise and
resources.
In order to replicate the Boston experience in other cities, four key
components must be present: (1) a strong commitment of the city,
the banking industry, and local developers to reinvest in inner-city
neighborhoods; (2) a combination of public and private funding
sources; (3) community organizations must work in partnership with
the city and banking industry to implement city initiatives similar
to those in Boston; and (4) a willingness on the part of lenders to
maintain flexibility in underwriting criteria used to process non-
traditional loans.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to describe and analyze how commercial
banks underwrite non-traditional loans in inner-city neighborhoods.
For the purposes of this study, non-traditional loans, sometimes
referred to as community development loans, are defined as loans
issued in disinvested urban areas with underwriting criteria used
which stray from traditional underwriting criteria. For example, as
illustrated in the case studies presented in chapter four, banks may
reduce the required debt coverage ratio (DCR) if a developer has a
certain percentage of a building pre-leased. Or, a higher loan-to-
value ratio (LTV) may be approved if the city made a financial
commitment to an inner-city project. Other methods used to
substitute underwriting criteria, in order to make non-traditional
loans viable, are presented in this study.
As federal and state resources continue to diminish, the lending
community has been asked to assume more responsibility for lending
in urban neighborhoods. Some of the recent pressure is a result of
the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, designed to require
lenders to meet the credit needs of their communities. In July,
1990, stricter disclosure legislation was passed. In Boston, several
city initiatives have provided some incentive for banks to
participate in non-traditional lending.
At the same time, however, increased regulation of financial
institutions, including banks and thrifts, has created a difficult
environment in which to maintain flexibility in underwriting
criteria needed to process non-traditional loans. Since bank
examiners and regulators were sobered by the Savings and Loan
(S&L) crisis of the mid 1980s, first in the southwest, they now want
to prevent it from recurring with the same impact in the northeast.
Therefore, standards have been tightened and banks are being
examined with more rigor. The effect on the availability of credit
for real estate-related ventures caused by the tighter regulations is
the subject of many arguments among lenders, regulators, and
developers.
This study is presented in five chapters. Chapter one sets the
national historical context in which to evaluate current lending
patterns and criteria. The history of the decline and subsequent
disinvestment of urban areas and the impact of this decline on
commercial banks' lending patterns and policies is outlined.
Specific examples from the Boston experience are documented.
Chapter two defines the problem associated with disinvestment in
inner cities: lack of affordable, available financing. Efforts to
change lending practices, focusing on national legislation and Boston
city initiatives, are described as vehicles to remedy the problem
defined earlier.
Chapter three provides a comparison of underwriting criteria used
for traditional and non-traditional loans. An understanding of
underwriting criteria is critical for chapter four, in which the case
studies of three Boston-based commercial banks and five loan
transactions are presented. Finally, from the information provided
in chapter four, chapter five analyzes the loan transactions in order
to determine whether or not they could be issued in today's
environment.
Methodology
In order to understand how commercial banks underwrite non-
traditional loans and to what extent their issuance will occur in the
future, case studies of three banks and five loan transactions are
presented. The case study method of research was selected to
provide a framework in which to compare and contrast how different
banks operate and what criteria are used in their evaluation process.
The case studies are based on a variety of data including written
information from banks as well as interviews with bank
representatives, developers, and public and quasi-public agencies.
The interview method was chosen to supplement information
pertaining to each loan transaction. The three banks used for the
case studies are Boston-based commercial banks, conducting lending
business in Boston urban neighborhoods, including Roxbury,
Dorchester and the South End. The loan transactions were all issued
within the last five years.
As part of the methodology, a literature review was conducted on
commercial lending patterns and practices, underwriting criteria for
traditional and non-traditional loans, federal, state, and local
efforts to enhance public and private reinvestment, and regulatory
activity as it pertains to financial institutions. Works presented by
Karen Kollias in her working paper entitled, "Community
Development Lending: Cutting Edge for Good Business"1 and a
process model by C.P. Line and C.E. Riesenberg entitled, "Principles
and Practices of Community Development Lending: A Five Step
Investment Model to Strengthen Bank Community Development
Programs" 2 were used to outline a framework for understanding
traditional and non-traditional underwriting criteria.
In addition, extensive interviewing was done with Boston lenders,
developers, and public and quasi-public agency officials. Eighteen
lenders, including workout specialists and community development
lending practitioners, were interviewed for this research. The
banking experience of the interviewees ranged from one year to over
twenty-five years. Professional positions ranged from assistant
vice president to division executive.
1 Karen Kollias, "Community Development Lending: Cutting Edge for Good Business",
(Washington: American Security Bank, 1988).
2 C.P. Line and C.E. Riesenberg, "Principles and Practices of Community Development
Lending: A Five Step Investment Model to Strengthen Bank community Development
Programs", (Minneapolis: The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and First Bank
System, 1989).
Generally, the interviews focused on construction lending, although
mini-perms and end-loans were also discussed. While the Boston
bankers interviewed took a conservative position on underwriting
criteria, most indicated that they utilize several non-traditional
mechanisms in the underwriting of community development loans.
Many of the lenders could not speak of their lending underwriting
without making reference to the current market conditions. Several
expressed concern about community development lending within the
context of the current regulatory environment and real estate
lending market.
In addition to the interviews with lenders, seven developers (five
non-profit and two for-profit) and four public and quasi-public
agencies were interviewed for this research. All of the interviews
were conducted confidentially which made frank discussion of
lending practices possible.
1.1 DECLINE OF URBAN AREAS
As the exodus from the industrial cities in the northeast and
midwest continued to occur throughout the 1950s and 1960s, there
were tremendous shifts in population and employment.
Suburbanization reached heightened levels by the 1960s adding to
the losses in population and employment. Those with the means to
move out of urban areas during this period were, for the most part,
white. On the other hand, many blacks were moving into the inner
city looking for employment opportunities. "As predominantly white
middle-income groups have dispersed from the cities.. .they have
been only partially replaced be predominantly lower-income
minority groups.. ."3 Highways and transportation systems made
commuting from the suburbs to inner city employment more
3 John D. Kasarda, "Urban Change and Minority Opportunities" in Paul E. Peterson, ed.,
The New Urban Reality, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1985), 33-34.
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accessible, thereby allowing those with means to live outside of the
inner city. These changes contributed to the decline in the inner
cities, particularly the Snowbelt cities of the northeast and the
midwest.
During the 1960s many of these Snowbelt cities became
predominantly black. At the same time, there were drastic changes
in employment activity in the city. Many manufacturing firms and
wholesalers moved out to the suburbs due to lower taxes, cheaper
rents and lower transportation costs. This demonstrated a real
decrease in blue-collar jobs for inner-city residents and a decline in
tax-producing activities. "Most large cities in the Northeast and
Midwest lost manufacturing jobs faster than they gained white-
collar work, leaving them with fewer jobs overall."4  In Boston,
during the period from 1967 to 1977, employment changes in the
central city decreased in the manufacturing, wholesale, and retail
sectors. 5 "Two types of urban change have left America's older
industrial cities in severe decline: technological innovations in
transportation, communication, and manufacturing have made their
infrastructure and land use patterns obsolete, and accelerating
racial change has made inner cities the primary home for minority
groups, particularly those with low incomes and poor job skills." 6
In Boston, during this time period, the same phenomenon occurred.
As industry left the inner city for less expensive locations along the
new Route 128 highway, middle-income whites followed. "The
historic pattern of suburban residents commuting to the city, to the
white-collar jobs, changed when industry moved out to the suburbs.
During the 1970s, Boston experienced a large decrease in jobs,
industry and income. This continued until 1975 when the high-tech
4 Bernard J. Frieden and Lynn B. Sagalyn, Downtown, Inc. How America Rebuilds Cities,
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 288.
5 Kasarda, "Urban Change and Minority Opportunities", 44.
6 Paul E. Peterson, The New Urban Reality, (Washington: The Brookings Institution,
1985), vii.
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industry boomed. Now, however, the city is experiencing another
decline."7  By mid 1980s "...persistent underemployment and poverty
and a mismatch between the skills and experience of the minority
labor force and the types of jobs that are growing fastest in
Boston's transformed economy were evident in 1985."8 Many of the
larger chain stores relocated to the suburbs, while small business
investment declined and many commercial businesses were unable to
survive. In addition, the housing stock suffered and property values
decreased. As a result, inner cities decayed and disinvestment
occurred.
Disinvestment
The term disinvestment refers to the unavailability of credit for
mortgage finance and lack of private and public investment in
certain urban areas. It is a phenomenon which continues to occur in
certain inner-city neighborhoods. Disinvestment "concerns the
general failure of landlords, lenders, business and local government
to make investment in particular areas because of their pessimistic
evaluation of that neighborhood's future."9 This creates a difficult
environment in which to obtain financing.
Lenders perceived inner city communities to be high risk areas in
which to make loans. "...there is little question that the economics
of financial risk, either real or perceived, is at the heart of the
disinvestment problem." 10 Lending institutions, therefore, invested
mainly in new construction going on in the suburbs, regardless of
where their depositors were from, and left the inner city
7 Personal interview with Mark J Waltch, Financial advisor to national developers and
financial institutions; July 9, 1990, Boston.
8 Jeffrey Brown, "Indicators of Minority Participation in Boston's Growing Economy",
(Boston: Boston Redevelopment Authority Research Department, 1986), 2.
9 Urban Consortium, Disinvestment in Urban Neighborhoods, (Washington: Public
Technology, 1977), 1.
1 0 Ibid., 7.
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communities without affordable financing sources.1 1 By denying
certain communities access to affordable financing, lack of
financing contributed to the deterioration of neighborhoods.
"...lending institutions contribute to the declining quality of life in
certain urban neighborhoods by refusing to grant mortgages even
though demand exists,..." 12 The more harmful effects included:
increase in the cost of housing due to higher debt service charged by
banks on loans perceived as riskier; reduced maintenance as a result
of reduced cash flow; reduction in perceived values of property;
deterioration and abandonment of property occur; and the economic
stability and housing market of an area was negatively impacted. 13
Therefore, banks were using different underwriting criteria for
those loans perceived as risky and areas suffering from
disinvestment were perceived as less valuable and less profitable.
Disinvestment and the impacts of redlining emerged as a national
issue in the late 1960s and into the 1970s, and, according to reports
conducted throughout the country, the problem of race
discrimination in lending practices continued into the 1990s.
Redlining
Redlining is a practice by lenders in which loans are rejected
regardless of the borrower's credit, character, property condition,
and the amount of deposits from the community in which the bank
serves. 14 A considerable amount of importance was assigned to the
type of neighborhood from which the loan application originated.
The result has been a divergence in lending practices between inner
city communities and the suburbs. Redlining prevented bankers from
11 Brimmer & Company, Inc., Risk vs. Discrimination In The Expansion of Urban Mortgage
Lending, (chicago: United States League of Savings Associations, 1977), 2.
1 2 Robert Schafer and Helen F. Ladd, Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, (cambridge: MIT
Press, 1981), 2.
1 3 Urban Consortium, Disinvestment in Urban Neighborhoods, 1.
14 Ibid., 3.
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becoming familiar with lending in minority communities, thereby
precluding any possibility of establishing relationships with
minority customers. The lack of relationships allowed the
perception of risk to perpetuate throughout many years.
In Boston, two studies recently released indicate that
discrimination in mortgage lending continues to occur in black
communities. The study, issued by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston, demonstrates a 24% gap in mortgage lending in black and
white neighborhoods. 15 The study, done by the Boston
Redevelopment Authority, illustrates an overall ratio in Boston of
2.9:1 during 1981-1987 (applies to one-to four-family mortgage
home loans). 16 Bank of Boston wrote 2.1 mortgages in white
neighborhoods for every mortgage issued in minority areas.
Shawmuts' ratio was 12:1; Baybanks' ratio was 11.7:1; and Bank of
New Englands' ratio was 2.6:1.17 Generally, it was found in the
Federal Reserve study that "more mortgages were originated
relative to the housing stock in predominantly white neighborhoods
than in predominantly black neighborhoods in Boston.." 18
Redlining and other forms of discrimination in lending have
contributed to the continued decline of inner city communities,
mainly minority communities. Without access to adequate and
affordable financing, these communities will continue to decline.
The data available to study mortgage lending practices was limited
to home mortgage loans. While it is important to distinguish loans
to developers from the related problem of loans to individuals for
mortgages, both are inextricably linked and, according to several
15 S. Syre, The Boston Herald, December 21, 1989, 44.
16 Ibid., 44.
17 Ibid., 41.
18 Katherine L. Bradbury, Karl E. Case and Constance R. Dunham, "Geographic Patterns of
Mortgage Lending in Boston, 1982-1987", (Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston,
1989), 13.
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lenders in Boston banks, similar criteria are used in the process of
evaluating both types of loans.
In Chapter four, case studies of five loan transactions, issued to
developers in Boston neighborhoods, are presented. The criteria used
to evaluate the loans include; property value, borrowers' net worth
and collateral, borrower's ability to repay the loan, and factors of
risk--financial, credit, construction, and marketing. These criteria
are also used to underwrite home mortgage loans. Moreover, the
success of the development loans often relies directly on the
availability of mortgage financing.
1.2 BANKING HISTORY
The decline of the center cities can be attributed, in part,to the
lending patterns of commercial banking institutions. In the 1950s,
most banks only lent to blacks if the property to purchase was
located in a black neighborhood. 19 In addition, the National
Association of Home Builders (NAHB) implemented separate but
equal housing for blacks. These examples indicate that racial
discrimination in lending and building practices contributed to the
segregation of blacks and whites. However, in 1962, the federal
government adopted the policy of preventing discrimination in
federally assisted housing. In 1968, under the Fair Housing Act, this
policy was extended to cover conventionally financed housing as
well. 20 However, for the most part, these policies were not
enforced by the government entities responsible for their
supervision. 2 1
19 Robert Schafer, "Discrimination in Housing Prices and Mortgage Lending" in Joint Center
for Urban Studies Working Papers No. 55-62, (Cambridge: Joint center for Urban
Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, 1979),
Working Paper No. 59, p.5.
20 Ibid., 5.
21 Ibid., 6.
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During the 1960s and 1970s, banks focused their lending on suburban
borrowers, including single-family home mortgages and loans on
suburban office buildings, shopping centers and apartment
buildings. 22 As urban decline continued, white flight to the suburbs
occurred, and housing and businesses deteriorated, banks shied away
from the "higher-risk" communities of inner cities. For the purpose
of this study, a higher-risk area is defined as an inner-city
neighborhood, suffering from disinvestment, where property values
are perceived as lower due to location. Lending institutions have
been accused of "redlining" certain neighborhoods and therefore have
prevented households and businesses from obtaining the necessary
financing to prevent the decline of the quality of life. "...lending
institutions do not provide mortgages in certain neighborhoods even
though the demand exists. As a result, quality of life declines in
these neighborhoods ...disclosure of lending patterns and regulation
of lending criteria and branching activities are necessary to prevent
private sector disinvestment in older central-city neighborhoods."23
As described by a Boston bank official, the history of banking has
taken many different turns. The 1960s can be characterized as a
confrontational period when the banks did not feel an obligation
invest in inner-city neighborhoods, therefore much of their deposits
were invested in the growing suburban areas. The 1970s marked the
beginning of communication between the banks and its communities.
Banks realized their obligation to serve the needs of their
depositors. The 1980s created an environment of partnerships:
private, public and non-profits. But by early 1980, when
deregulation occurred in banks, an atmosphere of competition for
profitable accounts and allowing banks to invest deposits in higher-
yield, high risk ventures was created.
22 Brimmer & Company, Inc., Risk vs. Discrimination In The Expansion of Urban Mortgage
Lending, 1.
23 Schafer, "Discrimination in Housing Prices and Mortgage Lending", 3.
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There was a shift in bank lending patterns away from inner-city
communities which paralleled the decline of the urban core. The
overall result was increased difficulty in the reinvestment of
capital in certain urban neighborhoods by virtue of the lack of
affordable available financing in these neighborhoods.
17
2.0 PROBLEM DEFINITION
Banks play an important role in whether or not a neighborhood
thrives or declines. Without available and affordable financing,
neighborhoods decline.24  Lending practices of commercial banks
have been held partially responsible for the lack of affordable
financing in certain Boston neighborhoods. This chapter describes
several factors which contributed to the lack of financing in urban
communities. Each factor creates barriers to available and
affordable financing for home mortgage and development loans in
urban neighborhoods. Deregulation shifted the emphasis of banking
to profitability at the expense of lower-income customers; The S&L
crisis increased regulatory controls which eliminated the flexibility
needed to process non-traditional loans; bank branch closings and
the lack of automatic teller machines (ATM) in lower-income areas
decreased accessibility to financing for this population; the strict
requirements imposed by the secondary-mortgage market made it
difficult for lower-income population to qualify for home loans; and
the credit crunch continues to make financing for any type of real
estate deal very difficult to obtain.
Deregulation
Prior to 1980, banks were tightly regulated. Loan interest rates
were regulated by either the Federal Reserve Bank or the state usury
laws. Since interest rates were set, there was no price competition.
The Financial De-Control Act of 1980 effectively deregulated
interest rates. This has changed the banking environment into one of
competition resulting in increased emphasis on profit. 25
24 charles Finn, "Mortgage Lending in Boston's Neighborhoods 1981-1987, A Study of Bank
Credit and Boston's Housing", (Minnesota: Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public
Affairs, University of Minnesota, 1989), i.
25 Massachusetts Community Action Program, Directors Association, Inc., "Letter
Regarding the Analysis and Recommendations Regarding Basic Banking Services",
(Boston: Massachusetts Community Action Program, 1989), 2.
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Deregulation shifted the emphasis of banking to high profitability,
often excluding lower-income areas from loan services. "...since
1980, we have witnessed a banking industry that has moved from a
tightly regulated profitable industry, serving the broad needs of
their communities, to one of substantial competition, resulting in an
increased emphasis on high profit operations, at the expense of low
profit services, needed by our clients."26  In effect, deregulation
contributed to the lack of financing available in certain communities
by virtue of the perceived lack of profitability potential.
The increased competition among banks discouraged small accounts
by imposing fees. Banks competed for the larger accounts and
avoided these smaller, presumed less-profitable accounts. As a
result of increased competition, many of the smaller, less powerful
banks failed to compete with the bigger banks and were forced to
eventually merge with the bigger banks. This put a great deal of
power in the hands of very few banks. "'While the deregulation was
designed to increase competition, the merger trend has the long
term opposite effect. Fewer larger banks are less likely to serve
the small niches of the marketplace that are less profitable (i.e. low
income customers)." 27 This has created a difficult environment in
which to obtain loans for home mortgages and development loans for
affordable housing and commercial projects in inner-city
neighborhoods.
S & L Crisis
Under deregulation, banks competed for the biggest, most profitable
accounts. During the 1980s FDIC-insured deposits grew. Banks and
S&Ls used depositors money to invest in over-priced real estate
deals, high-yield, high-risk junk bonds and they backed ill-advised
26 Ibid., 2.
27 Ibid., 2.
projects in inferior locations. 28 "When the real estate market was
really hot, some banks tended to disregard their underwriting
policies. Then as the market cooled they also failed to update their
policies with tighter standards to reflect the deteriorating
conditions. The result of these combined errors was a lot of bad
loans. "29
During this time there were lots of flips and other 'get-rich-quick'
ventures characterized by poor documentation. Due to the
entrepreneurial spirit of lending during the early 1980s, banks were
more concerned about the bottom line than the safety and soundness
of the loans. By the late 1980s many of these loans went bad and the
examiners from FSLIC came in to review the prudency of real estate
lending. Thus, by 1989 and 1990, the environment shifted to one of
regulatory control.
The southwestern part of the country, Texas in particular,
experienced a 'bottoming-out' of its real estate market, to a much
greater extent, in the mid 1980s. As a result, bank examiners and
regulators have come out in full force to minimize the experience in
the northeast. This too has contributed to the lack of financing due
to the scrutiny with which examiners are evaluating real estate
loans. According to Congressman Joseph Kennedy of Massachusetts,
the banks in the Northeast have been treated more harshly. In 1986,
Texas was in much worse shape than New England is now, however,
regulators were not as tough on Texas banks.30 The rigor with which
regulators are looking at bank loans is discouraging lenders to issue
any further credit.3 1
28 Patricia Chisholm, "The S&L Crisis", Maclean's, June 18,1990, 36.
29 Banker & Tradesman, June 13, 1990, 38.
30 Testimony of congressman Joseph P. Kennedy, 1l, "Hearing on Credit Crunch",
(Washington: United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
June 21, 1990), 13.
31 Ibid., 10.
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Deregulation has created some concern for the future of lending in
inner-city communities. In July 1990, Massachusetts passed the
interstate banking law which allows banks from outside of the state
to acquire Massachusetts banks. Many believe this has increased the
potential for new ownership of banks which will affect banks'
responsiveness to community needs in terms of credit because the
out of state bank may not be familiar with the specific needs of
certain neighborhoods in Boston and may be conducting business
long-distance.32
Bank Branch Closings
The actions taken by banks to avoid the 'low-income niches of the
marketplace' included closing less profitable branches, most
typically located in inner-city, urban core communities. "Half of the
bank branches in Mattapan, Roxbury, the Newmarket area and North
Dorchester have closed in the last 10 years-- a time of
unprecedented expansion in the banking industry. Other Whiter
neighborhoods held even. East Boston, West Roxbury and Hyde Park
gained branches over the last 10 years."33
According to Mary O'Hara of Massachusetts Urban Reinvestment
Advisory Group (MURAG) in her statement at one of a series of
forums held to encourage communication between banks and their
communities, there are several issues of concern regarding bank
branch closings in Boston. 34 First, many of the closings have
occurred in low-income neighborhoods. Second, there have been
many branch openings in the suburbs, particularly in shopping
centers and malls. Third, branches have been significantly
32 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Community Development Finance: Tools
and Techniques for National Banks, (Washington: The Office of the comptroller of the
Currency's Customer and Industry Affairs Division, 1989), 7.
33 The Boston Globe, January 15, 1990, A21&A22.
34 "Summary of Forum" held on July 13, 1989.
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downgraded in low-income areas. 35 According to Dr. Toye Brown of
Freedom House, as of July 1989 despite a huge market in Roxbury of
100,000 people, there were only three banking centers in Roxbury:
Dudley Station, Uphams Corner, and Grove Hall.36 Out of this forum
several areas of concern repeatedly came up including:
- few residents of minority areas have any bank
relationships;
- too few bank branches and ATMs are located in these same
areas, therefore, residents are forced to use check-cashing
services which charge a great deal of fees for their
services and preclude any chance of establishing bank
relationships; and
- market focuses on bigger depositors generating greater
profits to the bank.
"...Where once banks wanted branches and deposits but not loans, now
they want the loans without the branches and deposits." 37 However,
some banks, including Shawmut, Bank of Boston, First American, and
Neworld, have remained in lower-income minority neighborhoods. A
decrease in bank branches in lower-income areas creates difficulty
for the community to establish relationships with bankers in order
to increase accessibility to bank loans.
Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs)
Fewer ATMs have been opened in lower-income areas. ATMs
generally provide customers with free use of machines and other
bank-related services. "Only six 24-hour ATMs have been installed
in all four minority neighborhoods: Bank of Boston owns four of
35 "Assessing Boston's Community Bank Services and Products", 2.
36 Ibid., 2.
37 The Boston Globe, January 15, 1989, A21.
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them." 38 Instead of bank branches and ATMs, check-cashing stores
have opened within minority areas. However, check-cashing stores
do not take deposits and customers cannot establish and build bank
relationships for future bank loans. In addition, there is a large fee
charged for check-cashing services, which is generally provided at
little cost at a bank branch. Therefore, lower-income minority
people living in inner-city urban core areas are being denied access
to affordable capital.
Secondary-mortgage market
Although the scope of this thesis is limited to underwriting criteria,
similar patterns of discrimination have been observed in relation to
financial markets, such as the secondary-mortgage market. For
example, according to Karen Kollias of American Security Bank,
secondary markets require higher DCR and LTV ratios, which lenders
must meet if they intend to sell the loans to either the Federal
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) or the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac).39 If a borrower's loan
application does not meet the guidelines of the secondary-mortgage
market, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, many banks will
automatically reject the application. "The experience of the
Commonwealth's Mortgage Review Boards-...-suggests
nonconformance with secondary-market requirements is the single
leading cause of suspect-loan denials."40
Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac requirements place significant
constraints on a commercial bank's flexibility in its underwriting
criteria. The secondary-mortgage market prevents substitution of
criteria from occurring, due to the strict guidelines, and therefore
precludes non-traditional loans from the secondary market.
38 Ibid., A21.
39 Kollias, "Community Development Lending: Cutting Edge for Good Business", 20.
40 The Boston Globe, January 15, 1989, A22.
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Credit Crunch
The credit crunch, or lack of financing, currently occurring
throughout parts of the U.S., is making real estate financing very
difficult to obtain. As a result, financing for inner-city
development, historically perceived as risky, may become even
harder to obtain.
There is an on-going debate as to whether or not there is a credit
crunch occurring in certain parts of the country, particularly New
England. Certain politicians, including Congressman Kennedy and
Senator Kerry of Massachusetts, argue that there is indeed a credit
crunch in New England. John DiBella, President of Cenvest, Inc. in
Hartford, CT, agues that "...the federal regulators have been
responsible for restricting the majority--up to 80%-of commercial
credit extended to New England companies." 41 On the other hand,
Robert Clarke of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
and Alan Greenspan of the Federal Reserve Board (Fed), insist there
is not a credit crunch, but rather a tightening of standards in certain
areas due to economic factors.42
Part of the argument in New England centers around the regulators'
unprecedented rigor in examining banks and whether or not this has
contributed significantly to the lack of financing. Congressman
Joseph Kennedy states that regulators are extraordinarily tough on
New England banks and quotes industry experts in predicting that the
rigor is inducing a credit crunch in New England. 43 In addition,
regulators are reclassifying loans as non-performing even though
the borrower may be current on his/her debt service payments. This
41 Banker & Tradesman, June 27, 1990, 4.
42 Testimony by Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, (Washington:
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, June 21,
1990), 1.
43 Testimony of Congressman Joseph P. Kennedy, 11, "Hearing on Credit Crunch", 12.
24
intimidates banks from issuing real estate loans altogether.44 This,
in effect, restricts availability of financing.
According to Mark Waltch, a financial advisor to several nationwide
developers and financial institutions, commercial banks are
currently looking for ways to make real estate loans risk-free. In an
effort to mitigate risk, banks will either loan money to people with
enough capital to cover the amount of the loan or take a lot of
collateral, in addition to the real estate. For example, a bank in
Canada was approached by a national developer from the United
States, for a construction loan for a project in the U.S.. The bank
required the developer to deposit an amount equal to the loan into an
account in their bank. Another national development firm
approached a bank for a construction loan for the rehabilitation of a
building in Boston. The bank required an amount equal to 25% of the
loan amount, or $75,000,000, to be personally guaranteed. In
addition, the bank wanted to see 40% of the space pre-leased with
signed leases prior to issuing the construction loan. A large Texas
bank was recently ordered by regulators to reduce its loan portfolio
in real estate loans from 44% to 8%.45
This indicates that further real estate loans may be largely issued
to only those who do not need the loan. This essentially precludes
loans to non-profits with zero net worth and loans in inner-city
communities perceived as high risk whose real estate is not
considered sufficient collateral by a bank. 46
It is important to note that the credit crunch is not only the fault of
the regulators, but also of an existing economic slowdown in the
northeast which has been spurred on by a decline in the real estate
market. 47 According to Joseph Kennedy, real estate is depreciating
44 Ibid., 13.
45 Personal interview with Mark J Waltch; July 9, 1990.
46 Personal interview with bank official; June 19, 1990, Boston.
47 Testimony of Congressman Joseph P. Kennedy, 1I, "Hearing on Credit Crunch", 10.
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25% in the northeast. Real estate is market-driven and it is argued
that in the 1990s the demand no longer exists as it did during the
boom years.48
2.1 EFFORTS TO CHANGE LENDING PRACTICES
As urban decline spread throughout the Snowbelt cities, including
Boston, the commercial banks avoided investing in these areas due in
part to perceived higher risk. Lending institutions were considered
contributors to the declining quality of life in older, central-city
communities. 49 As a result of continued disinvestment in central
cities into the early 1970s, many states, including Massachusetts,
required banks to disclose mortgage lending information by census
tract or zip code.50 In 1975, Congress enacted the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA). HMDA is legislation requiring the disclosure
of mortgage lending activity nationwide.
In 1977, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was enacted in
response to redlining, requiring federal agencies to supervise
financial institutions to encourage them to help to meet the credit
needs of the communities where they are chartered while continuing
to meet the safe and sound requirements of mortgage lending. 51 The
CRA, however, failed to preserve bank branches and banking services
in lower-income minority areas of Boston. Concern among members
of minority communities and the Massachusetts Bankers Association
(MBA) have continued. In July, 1990, changes to the CRA rating
system went into effect. These changes were in response to recent
amendments to the CRA occasioned by the passage of FIRREA. 52
48 Testimony of Senator John Kerry, "Hearing on Credit Crunch", (Washington: United
States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, June 21, 1990), 18.
49 Schafer and Ladd, Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, 2.
50 Schafer, "Discrimination in Housing Prices and Mortgage Lending", 3.
51 Ibid., 3.
52 American Bankers Association, "Notes from American Bankers Association conference",
(Washington: American Bankers Association, June, 1990).
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Revisions to the CRA requires an institution to publicly disclose its
CRA rating and requires Federal regulatory agencies to provide
written evaluation of an institutions CRA performance. A new four-
tiered descriptive rating system replaced the old five-tiered
numerical rating system. 53
FIRREA
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989 (FIRREA) was enacted by Congress in response to the thrift
problem and the general problems of the banking industry,
particularly relating to real estate lending activity. FIRREA was
created to generally reduce risk and increase financial prudency,
specifically regarding housing production loans and other real
estate-related transactions. 54 FIRREA imposes very strict
standards in terms of lending, which, according to the NAHB, will
have dramatic unintended consequences on real estate lending and
homebuilding.55
FIRREA has had consequences for banks as well as thrifts. "FIRREA
has particularly altered the propensity of many banks and thrifts to
extend funds for the acquisition, development, and construction
(ADC) of residential and other real estate-related properties." 56 The
provisions of the legislation include stricter capital requirements,
increased single-borrower limitations, and the disallowance of
equity investments by thrifts in residential development deals. 57
While FIRREA applies directly to thrifts, it has far-reaching effects
on commercial banks by creating "an unfavorable environment where
53 Ibid.
54 Barbara T. Alexander, "Will 1990 Signal the End of a Demand-Driven Housing Market?",
(New York: Salomon Brothers, January 20, 1990), 4.
55 Ibid., 4.
56 Salomon Brothers Publication, (New York: Salomon Brothers, January, 1990), 3.
57 Ibid., 3.
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regulators are wary of real estate lending, affects both thrifts and
banks." 58 According to the NAHB, commercial banks cannot pick up
the slack from the thrifts in terms of lending and are tightening
their own underwriting criteria due to OCC warnings about the
dangers of real estate lending. 59 This bodes ill for construction and
development loans in the near future.
According to the Salomon Brothers study, the standards set by
FIRREA will become the minimum standards applied to all regulated
institutions. In other words, regulators will scrutinize real estate
loans issued by commercial banks using the same rules and
regulations they are currently applying to thrifts. A recent survey
by NAHB found that FIRREA legislation is contributing to a lack of
financing that is forcing many developers to decrease or stop
operations.60
City Initiatives
The city of Boston has demonstrated a strong commitment to
revitalizing the inner city neighborhoods by creating programs to
encourage both the public and private sectors to reinvest in Boston's
urban neighborhoods. The programs created have targeted certain
areas which have suffered from disinvestment. These programs have
encouraged both capital reinvestment and development of affordable
housing and commercial properties.
Mayor Raymond Flynn came into office in 1983 as a strong advocate
of implementing public policy on a city-wide basis to benefit
Boston's neighborhoods. With the assistance of Stephen Coyle,
58 National Association of Homebuilders, "Investment Sheet on the Financing of Acquisition,
Development and Construction Loans", (Washington: National Association of
Homebuilders, February 6, 1990), 5.
59 Ibid., 4.
60 Ibid., 1.
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director of the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA), Flynn began
to change the direction of Boston's public policy. The first program
put into effect was the linkage fund program. By July of 1985, Flynn
released draft guidelines for the revised program. He increased the
linkage payments to $6 per square foot, $1 of which would go to a
job training program and the remainder to affordable housing
development in the city. Later, parcel to parcel linkage was
executed to leverage city ownership of land to foster development in
the city neighborhoods. 61 These programs were designed to leverage
private money and continue to enhance lending opportunities in
certain neighborhoods of Boston.
The Safe Neighborhoods Program is part of the city's response to
some of the recent activities of youth gangs and violence which
contributed to the lack of bank investment in certain urban
neighborhoods. Business leaders, community leaders and city
officials worked cooperatively to put forth a series of proposals to
create housing and job opportunities in Boston's neighborhoods. 62
This indicates an effort to combine the expertise and resources of
the private and public sectors to share the responsibility for
revitalizing Boston's urban neighborhoods.
Another city agency committed to encouraging reinvestment in
Boston's neighborhoods is the Public Facilities Department (PFD). In
the 1980s, PFD, formerly the Neighborhood Development and
Employment Agency (NDEA), focused its policies on commercial
development in targeted areas of the city. The areas were chosen
based upon the lack of investment and the high rates of crime and
vacancies. The areas selected were urban Boston neighborhoods
throughout Dorchester and Roxbury. Due to the limited resources of
NDEA, it worked with local banks to invest in these targeted areas.
61 Telephone interview with Ralph Nemolo, Public Information Officer, Boston
Redevelopment Authority; July 9, 1990, Boston.
62 Ibid.
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However, many local banks would not invest due to perceived risk
and lower values associated with these areas.
In an effort to encourage lending in these areas, the Neighborhood
Community Development Bank (NCDB) was established. The NCDB set
up a program that encouraged bankers, with whom the city had
contracts, to lend to small businesses. The small businesses found
it difficult to obtain traditional financing without this program
because they were generally less sophisticated, not highly
capitalized and located in disinvested areas of the city. Through
NCDB, the city provided the funding that allowed the bank to write
down the interest rate for the borrowers. The objective of this
program and others implemented by NDEA/PFD was to encourage
banks to invest in areas of the city by providing tools to increase
the perceived safety and soundness of the loans.63
In 1985 NDEA was folded into PFD, with many of its policies and
programs remaining intact. While PFD continued to create programs
designed to encourage banks to lend in Boston's urban neighborhoods,
it also created an array of programs which did direct lending
without local banks. This change in program was a result of the
increasing difficulty in getting banks to invest in certain projects.
For example, PFD's LEND program provides flexible loan or grant
terms for any type of development. PFD leverages outside resources,
and provides gap financing to the borrower. The BUILD program
provides funding for large development projects. Block grant money
is used to issue short-term loans. As the money is repaid, it goes
into a revolving loan fund to be reissued to another project. 64
Project 747 is an effort to turn vacant city-owned land into
affordable housing. Most of the PFD-sponsored projects within the
last three years have been done via Project 747. PFD is currently
63 Telephone interview with Esther Schlorholtz, Assistant Director of Finance, Public
Facilities Department; July 11, 1990, Boston.
64 Ibid.
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focusing its efforts on both affordable housing and economic
development in some of the tougher areas of Boston where the
market is at its worst. These areas tend to have a higher minority
population and are suffering from disinvestment. " I know bankers
do not understand what we are up to or ...the agenda we have... From
the public perspective, it was most efficient to provide less subsidy
money and let the banks take the risks, but therein lies the problem-
-the banks would not take the risks.. .and during the last three years
we have had a difficult time." 65
More recently, in the late 1980s and 1990, as a result of two studies
issued in Boston to study mortgage lending patterns in inner-city
neighborhoods, there has been increased effort to create programs to
encourage lending in urban communities. The Massachusetts Bankers
Association (MBA), created in the 1980s to represent Massachusetts'
banks, in an effort to enhance lending opportunities to the lower-
income population, currently asked its members to create mortgage
programs with favorable financing rates and terms and to
participate in bank-sponsored affordable housing development and
small business organizations.66 In January, 1990, MBA proposed a
five year, $1 billion Community Investment Plan (CIP) designed to
provide mortgages for affordable housing and economic development,
increase the number of bank branches and extend banking services to
minority areas. CIP is an effort to involve both the public and
private sectors in reinvesting in lower-income, minority areas. 67
There have been many initiatives from grass roots organizations.
For example, in 1989 the Community Investment Coalition (CIC) was
formed as a coalition of community organizations. CIC proposed that
banks open new branches and ATMs in lower-income neighborhoods
65 Ibid.
66 Finn, Mortgage Lending in Boston's Neighborhoods 1981-1987, A Study of Bank Credit
and Boston's Housing, 48.
67 Carras Associates, "Initiatives, Development Finance", (Boston: Carras Associates,
Summer, 1990), 1&3.
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and offer affordable checking and savings accounts and check
cashing services to low-income customers. 68
The Minority Developers Association (MDA) is a significant player in
shaping many of the city initiatives. MDA has offered workshops to
the community on mortgage lending and initiated education for
minority owners and key managers. MDA has been very involved in
recent efforts to increase communication between the banking
industry and the minority communities regarding credit availability
and banking services.
Some Boston banks have developed and implemented mortgage loan
programs for low- and moderate-income borrowers utilizing flexible
underwriting criteria, reduced application fees and reduced closing
costs. 69 Other banks have agreed to pool resources into loan
consortia. For example, the Housing Investment Corporation (HIC)
was established and will be funded by a consortium of Boston-based
banks. The plan includes $100 million revolving line of credit from
which it will issue construction loans for community development
lending to for-profit and non-profits, ten new bank branches and
twenty ATMs in minority neighborhoods, and $10 million revolving
fund for small business loans. While the plan is statewide, half of
the funds are targeted to Roxbury, Mattapan, and North Dorchester.
There will be no direct lending by banks. All funds will flow through
HIC. 70
The initiatives demonstrated by the city of Boston and some Boston-
based banks indicate a strong commitment to join public and private
resources in order to end a long history of disinvestment in Boston's
urban neighborhoods.
68 Finn, Mortgage Lending in Boston's Neighborhoods 1981-1987, A Study of Bank Credit
and Boston's Housing, 45.
69 The Boston Globe, September 9, 1989, 49.
70 Personal interview with bank official; June 19, 1990, Boston.
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3.0 COMMERCIAL LENDING
This chapter presents a framework to use in analyzing the case
studies. The structure of commercial banks and how they are
regulated is outlined. A framework is provided in order to
understand traditional and non-traditional underwriting criteria as
presented by Karen Kollias in her working paper entitled,
"Community Development Lending: Cutting Edge for Good Business."
Kollias is a nationally recognized leader in community development
lending. The chapter presents a summary of interviews with Boston
bankers conducted to understand the actual lending practices used in
Boston. Finally, a brief overview of the process model in the
recently published handbook entitled, "Principles and Practices of
Community Development Lending" by C.P. Line and C.E. Riesenberg is
provided.
Commercial banks are in the business of making money by lending
and accumulating funds. "A commercial bank is a private financial
institution organized to accumulate funds primarily through time
and demand deposits and to make these funds available to finance
the nation's commerce and industry."71 Banks make money by
charging higher interest on money loaned out than on money accepted
as deposits. Many banks charge fees for services such as checking
accounts and credit cards. 72
Regulation
Commercial banks are regulated by any of several organizations.
Nationally-chartered banks are regulated by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Reserve Board
71 Marshall W. Dennis, Fundamentals of Mortgage Lending, (Reston: Reston Publishing
Company, Inc., 1978), 42.
72 Laura Duenes, Community Development Lending: Case Studies of Commercial Bank
Lending Programs, (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1989), 20.
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(Fed). State-chartered banks are regulated by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). S&Ls are regulated by the Office of
Thrift Supervision (OTS), formerly the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB). Bank holding companies are regulated by the Fed. 73 These
federal and state regulatory agencies were established to maintain
and promote "a system of bank supervision and regulation..."74
Bank examinations vary from regulator to regulator. Generally, the
Fed conducts examinations every 18 months, FDIC and OTS every 24
months, and OCC is on a lottery system. Regulators get involved in
bank operations in several ways. First, commercial banks must be
federally- or state-chartered by a regulating agency. Prior to
issuing a charter, the OCC and most state banking agencies require
the bank "to meet the convenience and needs of their communities." 75
Second, regulators promote the safety and soundness of loans by
requiring banks to utilize "sound management principles and comply
with the law." 76 Also, regulators encourage banks to "satisfy
customers and community needs while remaining efficient
competitors in the financial service markets." 77  Through guidelines
enforced by the regulators, maximum loan terms and maximum
aggregate lending as a percentage of total deposits or capital are
regulated. In addition, regulators review banks in terms of
compliance with "legal requirements such as those involving
privacy, discrimination, and CRA."78 Compliance is also reviewed in
terms of rules and regulations including "...loan amounts supported
by acceptable appraisals, prudent underwriting to minimize offset
risk, and loan portfolios that are diverse and not overly concentrated
with one project type."79 Third, regulators approve or deny
73 Telephone interview with representative of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston; July 9,
1990, Boston.
74 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Community Development Finance: Tools
and Techniques for National Banks, 1.
75 Ibid., 3.
76 Ibid., 1.
77 Ibid., 1.
78 Telephone interview with bank examiner; July 9, 1990, Boston.
79 Kollias, "Community Development Lending: Cutting Edge for Good Business", 16.
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applications for relocation, expansion, branching, new charters,
merging, and other changes in the banks' structure. "Regulators
grant and deny such requests on the basis of the bank's history,
financial solvency, and ability to meet its charter obligations." 80
According to a bank examiner at the Fed in Boston, examiners are
now reviewing bank loans for prudency. However, examiners have
always conducted periodic examinations of banks and their loans.
According to the Fed, they have always examined banks in terms of
(i) assessment of quality of assets; (ii) condition of banks regarding
safety and soundness and compliance of loans; (iii) review of bank
balance sheet including loan review. Generally, red flags go up on
real estate loans which have an LTV of100% because this ratio is
considered unsafe. Also, larger, troubled loans classified or
reclassified as non-performing loans are scrutinized carefully. 8 1
Key bank officials have stated that within the last two years,
regulators have changed the criteria used to evaluate the safety and
soundness of loans. According to Congressman Joseph Kennedy,
regulators have not changed the rules, but they are more rigorous in
their application. 82  Regulators from the Fed indicated that their
criteria have not changed, but their methods have changed due to the
current state of the economy. During a real estate boom period,
banks have more flexibility in their underwriting because the market
can withstand more flexibility. Whereas, during a downturn, there is
less flexibility due to greater risk. Regulators have reacted to this.
Examiners are still looking at loans in terms of the numbers,
primarily the DCR, LTV, appraisal values, and the like.8 3
80 Duenes, Community Development Lending: Case Studies of Commercial Bank Lending
Programs, 21.
81 Personal interview with bank examiner, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston; June 29,
1990, Boston.
82 Testimony of Congressman Joseph P. Kennedy, 11, "Hearing on Credit Crunch", 12.
83 Personal interview with bank examiner, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston; June 29,
1990, Boston.
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Regulators are scrutinizing banks within the framework of
particular standards per the Fed, OCC, and FDIC. At the same time,
per revised CRA regulations (effective 7/1/90) which are stricter in
terms of disclosure, regulators are telling banks to be creative in
order to fulfill their CRA obligations. 84 According to bank lenders,
the mixed message creates an atmosphere of confusion for the
banks, interpreted by the banks to mean "stop lending." Added to the
confusion is the lack of communication of information among
different regulatory agencies and the bankers. According to many of
the Boston banks, the regulators have had the greatest impact on the
banking industry to date. Industry experts anticipate that banks will
stop making real estate loans altogether. According to Federal
Reserve analysts, lending in first quarter 1990 is less than fourth
quarter 1989 and is predicted to continue to decline.85
The fact that banks did not invest in inner cities due to the
perceived higher risk through the 1980s and into the 1990s is quite
ironic considering the history of bank investment post-deregulation.
Deregulation created an investment atmosphere best described as
high risk. Financial institutions, particularly the S&Ls, invested a
great deal of their depositors money into high risk ventures which
eventually turned bad, creating many of the problems banks are
facing in the 1990s. The result of these high-risk ventures has been
increased regulation. As the issue of redlining and disinvestment
has resurfaced via new studies issued in Boston and other parts of
the country, increased pressure on the banks to meet their
obligations to serve the financial needs of their communities has
been the result. It is now more difficult to substantiate
underwriting criteria necessary to make non-traditional type loans
in disinvested areas. Therefore, the disinvested communities have
been hurt by the S&L debacle.
84 Personal interview with bank official; June 19, 1990, Boston.
85 Testimony of congressman Joseph P. Kennedy, 11, "Hearing on Credit crunch", 8.
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3.1 COMMERCIAL BANK UNDERWRITING
The interviews with industry representatives confirm that Kollias'
framework is applicable to understanding lending in Boston.
Comparing the framework with the results of the interviews reveals
both similarities and subtle differences. Bankers were asked what
factors they consider in evaluating a loan; not all responded
initially with the underwriting criteria they used, although most
broached the subject without being prompted by the interviewer.
Six of the lenders and two of the bankers in workouts commented on
underwriting criteria for traditional lending.
It is significant to note that very few of the bankers speak of
lending and underwriting criteria without mentioning the current
market conditions. Many make distinctions between lending today
and lending three to five years ago. Generally, lenders attribute
differences in lending activity over time to changes in the real
estate market, competition created by deregulation and pressures
imposed by regulators.
Lenders' assessment of the current market and the impacts on
lending practices provides a lens into the future of commercial
lending. Generally, lenders indicated that lending in the 1990s will
become much more difficult to do. When asked about loans currently
being evaluated, one lender stated, "...Nothing even comes in the door.
Well, one came in the door, but there was a cash flow shortfall. It
was real tight as to whether they could make the interest payments.
The collateral was non-existent and the organization did not have
the wherewithal to do the project."86 The lender commented that
the bank was committed to providing advice, time, and inkind
services to the applicant, but the market was very bad for issuing
loans.87
86 Telephone interview with bank official; July 6, 1990, Boston.
87 Ibid.
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Another lender explained that lenders are returning to basics in
terms of underwriting. "A lot of banks have suffered losses of
capital and are not looking to lose anymore... there are more problem
assets now and banks are more reluctant to stretch [their
underwriting criteria]." 88 The lender concluded the interview with
an evaluation of the impact competition has had on his bank's lending
practices:89
Lending is not scientific. You can't make a checklist. We see
how competition drove us away from what has been historically
considered prudent lending. We wanted to increase our earnings
by 20% like everybody else and nobody was smart enough to turn
that down.
3.2 TRADITIONAL LENDING AND LENDER INTERVIEWS
Kollias describes four basic criteria that banks use to underwrite
projects: credit of the borrower, character of the borrower,
collateral value of the project, and cash flow from the project.
Credit of the Borrower
"Credit analysis of the borrower enables the bank to determine the
borrower's previous and current borrowing history." 90 People with
extensive positive borrowing history are good; people with no
borrowing history are considered more risky since there is no
experience to evaluate. In fact, people with no borrowing history
are not much better from the bank's perspective than borrowers with
poor credit histories.9 1
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Kollias, "Community Development Lending: Cutting Edge for Good Business", 18.
91 Ibid., 18 & 19.
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Only three of the bankers specifically mentioned credit of the
borrower, both current and previous credit, as part of the set of
criteria used to evaluate a loan. Two of the three are lenders at
smaller banks. One lender said that he considers "...the
sophistication of the borrower,..whether the borrower had good
credit, and the borrower's relationship with the bank."92 One
possible explanation for this is that clear credit may be one of the
most basic and least subjective requirements that a bank considers
during its loan review process. A former lender made the following
comment on underwriting criteria:93
...in retail lending you looked at income, credit, and
downpayment... in lending for owner-occupied residential, you
looked at job stability, clear credit, percent of income to loan,
and size of downpayment...
He continued to say that the structure of commercial loans is more
of an art. "Five years ago, we all thought it was easy. Inflation was
helping us out...by the time a loan went bad we had more equity."94
Now banks require more equity and better market research, but
"...lenders never compromise on credit."95
Character of the Borrower
Kollias describes character of the borrower as follows:96
Character, which can be a subjective evaluation measure, is
often determined by [how substantial the borrower's financial
statements are and how well a lender may know the borrower].
The ability and amount of what someone may borrow is often
92 Telephone interview with bank official; June 28, 1990, Boston.
93 Telephone interview with bank official; July 6, 1990, Boston.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Kollias, "Community Development Lending: Cutting Edge for Good Business", 19.
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determined by his or her net worth, and the liquidity of that net
worth.
Of eight lenders interviewed, only two spoke in literal terms about
the character of the borrower. Nevertheless, all of the lenders
addressed the subject indirectly through related issues pertaining to
borrower's character, such as guarantees, equity, deposits, and
income. Many of the lenders listed guarantees and equity among
items required in the loan review.
One lender from a large bank explained that when considering a
borrower, she looks at their personal financial statements and
operating history of their other development projects. She uses a
network of attorneys, accountants, and brokers to collect
information necessary to complete the review of the borrower. She
characterizes this type of work as "investigative" and noted that
some borrowers were known names and some were unknown. A
written report to loan committee on the borrower often includes
information about who the borrower is, the borrower's legal entity,
the guarantor, and the guarantor's relationship with the borrower. 97
The other lenders made distinctions about what was done several
years ago as compared to what is done today. One lender said: 98
Several years ago 100% loans were made...[the banks] weren't
looking at the developer's financials...they were just looking at
the project's financials... now, [the bank] is requiring equity and
full disclosure of all the developer's properties.
Another lender implied that there were cases when loans were made
to developers without financial resources. "Three years ago if you
could write a decent proposal you could get a loan. Banks bought off
97 Telephone interview with bank official; July 2, 1990, Boston.
98 Telephone interview with bank official; July 6, 1990, Boston.
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on outrageous rent projections, minimum debt coverage service, and
developers without financial resources." 99
Another lender noted that the information from the borrower must
include cash flows for each of the guarantor's properties. This
allows the bank to consider not only the strength of the guarantor
and the project, but other factors as well. For example, the lender
requires cash equity of 20-25% from a strong developer, but will
most likely not accept land value as equity.100 In addition, a lender
could not fund a project if the cash flow was not there at the time
of underwriting, even if the borrower had a strong relationship with
the bank and projections for future cash flow.101
Collateral Value of the Project
The collateral value of the project is the third criterion used by
banks:1 02
A bank usually lends no more than 80% of the project's appraised
value as a general rule of thumb consistent with regulations. If
the project, or its location, is considered risky, this percentage
may decrease accordingly.
All eight lenders considered the collateral value of the project in
their loan review process. Lenders look for loans secured by the real
estate, personal guarantees, and LTVs of 75-80%.103 One lender
said the preferred LTV is 65-70%, with exceptions up to 80%.104
99 Telephone interview with bank official; June 29, 1990, Boston.
100 Telephone interview with bank official; July 5, 1990, Boston.
101 Ibid.
102 Kollias, "Community Development Lending: Cutting Edge for Good Business", 19 & 20.
103 Telephone interview with bank official; June 28, 1990, Boston.
104 Ibid.
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Many bankers commented on the increased importance of outside
appraisals in determining the value of the collateral. One lender
described a report submitted to loan committee which included an
explanation of the type and terms of the loan, the type of real estate
product and its collateral value, the location of the property,
additional security for the loan, and a summary of the loan indices
such as LTV and DCR. The lender said that at one time, she would
have found a comfortable capitalization rate (cap rate) based on
level of risk. However, as the market deteriorated, the use of
appraisals replaced cap rates. 105
Another lender noted that while the underwriting standards had not
changed, the implementation or adherence to them had changed. For
example, several years ago a lender could have avoided having an
appraisal completed simply by concluding "...if you cap the NOI at X%,
the loan will be at 70% [LTV].. .or 50% of value, so we do not need an
appraisal.." 106 However, now the appraisal is an absolute. 107
Cash Flow from the Project
All lenders mentioned cash flow from the project as a critical
element in the loan evaluation. Lenders typically require an existing
operating statement or cash flow projections. The lender is
concerned with the project's net operating income (NOI) in order to
calculate what is available to repay the loan. NOI is project revenue
less operating expenses. NOI is divided by the debt service payment
in order to calculate the DCR. The DCR varies depending on the value
of the property, the financial strength of the customer, and the level
of risk perceived by the lender. 108 According to Kollias, "A common
example [of a debt coverage ratio] isl.15...For projects perceived as
105 Telephone interview with bank official; July 2, 1990, Boston.
106 Telephone interview with bank official; July 5, 1990, Boston.
107 Ibid.
108 Kollias, "Community Development Lending: Cutting Edge for Good Business", 20.
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risky, it is likely that a bank may require a minimum of 1.25 debt
service coverage ratio." 109 DCRs mentioned by the lenders
interviewed generally ranged from 1.15 to 1.25. A lender who had
used a DCR of 1.15 several years ago stated that the DCR would be
higher today.110
Portfolio Issues
Issues pertaining to the bank's loan portfolios surfaced consistently
during many of the interviews. Several of the comments included
below are indicative of how the banks' considerations on the
portfolio level impact the placement of any one loan within their
portfolio. Generally, there is increased pressure from state and
federal regulators to diversify bank portfolios which contain a
predominance of real estate loans.
One lender from a large institution stated that one recently revised
written bank policy deals with the portfolio distribution of real
estate assets including land, industrial, commercial and residential
uses. There is now a cap on the amount of real estate loans in the
bank's portfolio.1 11
Another lender echoed a similar point when she explained her bank's
new portfolio limits and lending parameters created to diversify the
portfolio and reduce the bank's exposure: 112
We've been in real estate for [decades]... and will go forward if
something mitigates the risks... we are not going to take the
risks anymore... we didn't get paid enough for it... the point is to
eliminate the risks.
109 Ibid., 20.
110 Telephone interview with bank official; July 6, 1990, Boston.
111 Telephone interview with bank official; July 5, 1990, Boston.
112 Telephone interview with bank official; July 6, 1990, Boston.
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On the other hand, a lender from a smaller bank indicated that she
has maintained her bank's lending limits in underwriting loans. The
bank's lending policy continues to limit the amount of a mortgage
loan to no more than 15% of capital, no more than 30% of capital may
go to one borrower, and total land loans may not exceed 20%. The
lender stated that the bank's portfolio contained a mix among home
mortgage loans, commercial real estate loans, and commercial
business loans. However, the bank is currently scaling back its
lending activity.1 13
The changes in bank policies and attitudes led one lender to reflect
on the events that contributed to the changes in commercial lending.
The condominium market slumped first and the office market was
not far behind because of the continued overbuilding. "Right now
lending is not on the top of anyone's list."114 The bank has made a
decision to continue real estate lending, but the real estate
portfolio is too large.1 15
3.3 NON-TRADITIONAL LENDING AND LENDER INTERVIEWS
According to Kollias, when the four underwriting criteria, described
in the section on traditional lending, are put together, many non-
traditional, community development projects do not receive bank
financing. Kollias explains further:116
Aside from the obvious disadvantages that potential borrowers
face with respect to credit history and character, many
community development projects generate marginal cash flow,
and the overall value of the project may not be substantial.
Nonprofit and minority developers who do not have substantial
net worth may have a difficult time putting equity into the
113 Telephone interview with bank official; July 9, 1990, Boston
114 Telephone interview with bank official; July 5, 1990, Boston.
115 Ibid.
11 6 Kollias, "community Development Lending: cutting Edge for Good Business", 20.
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project (i.e., 20% of the project costs if total project costs
roughly equals its appraised value and the bank lends 80% of the
project costs) and guaranteeing loan repayments if the debt
service coverage ratio is thin.
Kollias maintains that community development lending is good
business, "When structured correctly, a community development loan
can be as profitable as any other loan." 117 For this reason, she
advocates a non-traditional approach to community development
lending which begins with a commitment by the bank "to distinguish
between good and bad community development investments."1 18
Non-Traditional Underwriting Criteria
Kollias uses her own experience at American Security Bank (ASB) to
illustrate how underwriting criteria can be adjusted to determine
the economic feasibility of non-traditional loans. When the
Community Development Group was formed at ASB, they reviewed
the bank's traditional underwriting criteria and decided to
emphasize cash flow from the project and collateral value of the
project. "The group's approach to 'project-based underwriting'
includes: treating subordinate sources of finance as project equity;
calculating debt service coverage only for the bank's debt, and
accepting other sources, reserves or guarantees as additional
coverage if cash flow tight..." 119 While the group emphasizes
project cash flow and collateral, they do not ignore credit history
and character of the borrower. The group does not turn applicants
away because they do not have substantial financials, but looks for
"...a description of technical capacity and previous or current
experience..."1 20
117 Ibid., 27.
1 18 Ibid., 26.
119 Ibid., 37.
120 Ibid., 39.
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Kollias stresses the importance of the borrower's track record. Her
approach to non-traditional lending implicitly requires the lender to
understand a broader spectrum of risks. "The estimation of risk,
and how to deal with it, is part of the bank's underwriting
process." 121 A process model included in a handbook entitled,
"Principles and Practices of Community Development Lending",
written by C.P. Line and C.E. Riesenberg, attempts to identify and
respond to specific risks in non-traditional lending.
The Process Model
The objective of C.P. Line and C.E. Riesenberg's work in "Principles
and Practices of Community Development Lending", is to promote the
theory and practice of non-traditional lending. 122 Their work is
written from a banker's perspective and provides an analytical
process which draws from the traditional underwriting process used
by many private financial institutions.123 The authors maintain
that, "the creative community investment process is really no
different from the normal credit review process, except for the
addition of a loop that identifies the financial gap often present in
community loans and then seeks public enhancement as a co-
investment." 124
The handbook presents a five step model used to perform a detailed
risk analysis. Conceptually, the model is useful because it
separates 'perceived risk' into components and offers specific
techniques to mitigate each component.
121 Ibid., 18.
122 C.P. Line and C.E. Riesenberg, "Principles and Practices of Community Development
Lending: A Five Step Investment Model to Strengthen Bank community Development
Programs", 4-1.
123 Ibid., 4-1.
124 Ibid., 4-1.
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The first step of the model presents an institutional underwriting
process which includes an analysis of the following: "...appraisals,
credit worthiness of leases, local market characteristics, character
of the developer, and the financial management capability of
community resources." 125 The handbook instructs the lender to
project future cash flows and to determine the 'financial gaps' in a
project by using ratio analyses such as, DCR, LTV, and cash flow
rate. 126
In step 2, the 'financial gaps' identified in step 1 are "...grouped into
four principle types, each of which has distinctive characteristics
and thus unique remedies." 127 The four groups of financial gaps are:
high risk, low return, low profitability, and interest rate risk. High
risk is broken down into credit risk, collateral risk, and maturity
risk, all of which affect the likelihood that the principle is
recaptured. Low return is characterized by an inadequate return to
investors. Low profitability is characterized by an inadequate
return to the lender. Interest rate risk affects the likelihood that
interest rates will fluctuate over the term of the loan resulting in
loss of interest income to the lender. 128
Once the financial gaps are identified in step 2, step 3 of the model
guides the lender through matching the gaps to the correct financial
solutions or credit enhancement technique options. 129 In step 4, the
model aides the lender in the selection of appropriate assistance
techniques. 130 Finally, in step 5 community assistance techniques
are matched to specific community assistance programs. 131
125 Ibid., 5-2.
126 Ibid., 5-1.
127 Ibid., 6-1.
128 Ibid., 6-7.
129 Ibid., 7-2.
130 Ibid., 8-2.
131 Ibid., 9-2 to 9-6.
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Interviews on Non-Traditional Lending
The interviews with six lenders and two former lenders
demonstrated how Boston community development lending differs
from Kollias's framework. It appears that although these particular
Boston bankers take a conservative approach, they utilize some of
the available non-traditional mechanisms in order to participate in
community development lending. Several lenders expressed concern
about the future of community development lending within the
context of the current regulatory environment and real estate
lending market. They also spoke about problems in community
development lending in general.
Kollias stated that her group at ASB emphasizes project cash flow
and collateral value. Furthermore, credit history and character of
the borrower are not ignored, but are considered in light of the
borrower's track record and/or expertise. In contrast to this
approach, a community affairs banker of a large bank said of a
community development loan that "...if it did not fit into the
traditional lending criteria, it would not have been made." 132
However, a lender at the same bank described the evaluation process
of community development loans as placing greater emphasis on
cash flow, rather than collateral value. The lender described the
focus on cash flow as follows:133
...inner city deals require funding sources... it is an alphabet soup
of players... we look to see if we think that the property will
lease at proforma levels, or whether the units will sell within
the right time frame... we look at the track record of the entity
and whether they have the capacity to do this particular
project... we don't assume any appreciation, depreciation, or
vacancy rate... we look at appraisals carefully as if things were
going to be stable... and translate them into conservative cap
132 Telephone interview with bank consultant; June 26, 1990, Boston.
133 Telephone interview with bank official; July 11, 1990, Boston.
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rates or discount rates. We try to determine if the deal makes
economic sense... We try to make it workable with all players at
whatever the level of debt...
The lender also evaluated the equity committed to the project and
the strength of the borrower: 134
...the structure of the deal is key. You generally need as much
below market rates as you can get, as much equity, as many
grants, deferred loans and subordinate financing as possible. We
are asking for more equity these days. We try to look beyond the
cash flow of the single project, but it depends on the structure
of the entity. You have no recourse in a limited partnership. We
look not so much at what their financial fallback is, but what is
their capacity and if they are over their heads...and whether they
have other projects that are sapping their resources, personnel,
or energy. Non-profits don't have deep pockets. In a for-profit,
we have a guarantee and its meaningful. For these projects, we
want to know about what is going on in all the other properties.
Whether the projects are non-profit, for-profit, inner-city, or
rural, the policies are no different--we look at all of them the
same...
Another lender at a large bank expressed a similar attitude about
using non-traditional lending mechanisms within a conventional
approach. "Are we conservative? You bet!.. I am a banker... that is
the expertise I bring to the table. It doesn't mean I don't care. It
means I don't program things to fail from a banker's perspective."1 35
In explaining her approach, she commented that bankers had to be
comfortable with the numbers. She explained the ways to find
comfort in the numbers: 136
...you do not eliminate criteria [in underwriting non-traditional
loans] you substitute ... and your level of comfort comes from
your experience and knowledge about the substitutions you
134 Ibid.
135 Personal interview with bank official; June 19, 1990, Boston.
136 Ibid.
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make... you have to understand the downside of using government
programs as cash equity... you have to understand how they are
funded... when they are funded and what the conditions [of
funding] are... you have to keep current with the players... you
have to have a contact in the government so you know who to
call... you can only be an effective advocate if you know what
you are advocating.
Examples of "substitutes" include developer expertise and
experience, the reputation of the construction manager, a
commitment for permanent takeout, credit enhancements, and
outside appraisals.137
While another lender at a smaller bank communicated a fairly
conservative approach to community development lending, she also
noted that in cases where the sources and uses did not match, she
considered certain city contributions as equity. In her loan
evaluation, she looked at construction risk, marketing risk, credit
risk, and financial risk.138
A lender with experience in issuing loans for affordable housing
stated that in evaluating loans, he considers the track record and
capacity of the borrower, the financials including a line by line
analysis of developer's profit, the pros and cons of using non-union
labor, the reasonableness of estimates, and the reputation of the
contractor, management company, and development team. 139
137 Ibid.
138 Telephone interview with bank official; July 3, 1990, Boston.
139 Telephone interview with bank official; June 29, 1990, Boston.
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4.0 CASE STUDIES
This chapter presents case studies of five loan transactions issued
by three Boston-based banks between 1986 and 1989. All five case
studies provide the bank's perspective, and three of the five provide
the developer's perspective as well. All information in the case
studies was provided by the banks, developers, and public and quasi-
public agencies. The names of the banks, lenders, developers, and
projects have been changed due to the proprietary nature of the
information.
4.1 ABC BANK
ABC Bank, a state-chartered bank regulated by the FDIC and state
agencies, is a small, local bank established in early 1980. Eighty
percent of its portfolio is concentrated in real estate, particularly
in housing and small business loans in low-income areas. Its target
areas of lending included Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan.
ABC Bank, a relationship lender, looked to the borrower for a
demonstration of strong commitment and spirit. It benefitted from
establishing strong relationships within the minority community in
which it served. One of its objectives was to commit funds in
disinvested areas of Boston.
Its targeted communities, often perceived as higher-risk, have been
the victim of unaffordable mortgage terms including higher interest
rates and points. Such unfavorable terms, generally offered by
private lenders, have made it difficult for customers in these
communities to reinvest in their neighborhoods.
ABC Bank's philosophy was described as working closely with its
borrowers, often less sophisticated CDCs and other non-profit
organizations. There was a need for creativity in order to produce
feasible loan packages that met the criteria of loan committee as
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well as safety and soundness requirements of the regulators. ABC
Bank, therefore, monitored each project carefully. A loan officer,
assigned to each proposed loan application, worked closely with the
developer to put together a do-able package. One loan officer
referred to the close working relationship he maintained with many
borrowers throughout the entire development process as a "cradle to
grave" relationship.
The underwriting criteria generally used by the bank was fairly
traditional, but ABC maintained a great deal of flexibility on the
numbers and allowed for public subsidies to be considered as equity.
Often the flexibility was substantiated through long-term
relationships with borrowers. For example, it looked for a DCR of
1.25 but had gone down to a 1.10, depending on the borrower. Also, a
65-70% LTV was preferred, but depending on the relationship with
the developer, it was as high as 80%. In addition, public subsidies
had been used by borrowers as leverage for private investment. A
loan application with a grant from the City of Boston gave the bank a
great deal of comfort. The average loan amount issued by the bank
was $300,000 to $800,000.
ABC described being creative as "minimizing your risk, making the
project worthwhile, and knowing how to find other resources if
needed." 140 Every loan officer should understand the state and
federal programs with available funding sources.
140 Personal interview with bank official; June 28, 1990, Boston.
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ABC Bank--Loan #1
Background
Several local Community Development Corporations (CDCs) joined
forces in mid 1980 to form an entity called the CDC-Group to
produce 84 condominium units of affordable housing. The CDC-Group
illustrated a creative collaboration of community-based groups in an
effort to develop housing in a disinvested area in Boston. This non-
traditional collaboration of CDCs recognized the different levels of
capacity of each organization and drew on the expertise and
strengths of each to create a strong development team. Each CDC
packaged their designated properties financing and marketing.
Property
In 1969-1970, an Infill Housing Program was undertaken by HUD and
a private developer to construct 400 units of family housing on
vacant sites scattered throughout Boston. Over 100 units in 17
structures were begun, but the project was abandoned before they
were finished. In 1986, the abandoned shells were still standing and
continued to be an affront to the neighborhoods in which they were
located as well as the city. The property consisted of 124,067
square feet of land and 89,508 square feet of interior.
The 17 structures, located in several Boston urban neighborhoods,
were packaged as one development project to take advantage of the
economies of scale and provided the hope that the project would be
completed, thereby adding to the quality of life in the neighborhood.
Improvements
The 17 structures were rehabilitated into 84 condominium units.
The buildings were made up of 40-2 bedroom units; 36-3 bedroom
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units; and 9-4 bedroom units. Units contained approximately 912-
2736 square feet. Amenities within the unit included ample closet
space, washer/dryer hook-up, two full bathrooms for the 3-bedroom
and 4-bedroom units, ample kitchens and comfortable to ample
bedroom sizes. The land and building were donated at no cost to the
CDCs.
The Deal--ABC Banks' Perspective (Phases I and Il)
The CDC-Group applied to ABC Bank for a revolving construction loan
and temporary first mortgage. The sources and uses of financing
were as follows:
Sources of Funds:
Cash Equity
Public Source-1
Public Source-2
Public Source-3
Other Equity Sources
Land & building from Public Source-1
Building permit waived/City
Public Source-1 Tech assist./Comm Dev.
500,000
200,000
21,300
840,000
56,642
90,000
Total Equity $ 1,707,942
Debt Financing:
ABC Bank & participants
CDFC
6,262,311
200,000
TOTAL SOURCES $ 8,170,253
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Uses of Funds:
Construction cost
Soft cost
Total Contingency
Account
$ 5,610,000
$ 1,371,193
$ 349,060
$ 840,000
$ 8,170,253TOTAL USES
The proposed participants for construction financing included three
banks. ABC bank's portion was approximately $2,000,000 at 10%
interest rate for a period of 1.25 years. The LTV was 76.6% based on
development costs. Developer's fee of $112,200 or 2% of hard costs
was allocated to the CDCs.
Source of Repayment
Repayment of loan was via sale of condominium units. Units were
released at 95% of the actual sales price.
a.) The Homeowner Opportunity Program (HOP) in
conjunction with ABC bank assisted in 63 units. (8 units
in phase I were market-rate).
b.) 21 units were taken out by Boston Housing Authority
(BHA) under the 705 program.
Terms of the Takeout
HOP financing provided an assisted interest rate beginning at 5.5%
and increasing 1% each of three years until the interest rate floated
to 8.5% in nine years. ABC Bank worked in conjunction with MHFA to
provide individual take-out loans to qualified homebuyers for both
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HOP and conventionally financed mortgages. Resale controls were
required to prevent speculation and preserve affordability.
ABC bank worked closely with the CDCs throughout the development
process and with the mortgage applicants in order to expedite the
closing process.
Developer's Perspective
According to the CDCs involved in the development, the project
ended up being split into two phases because of problems with ABC
bank. ABC bank was not in a position to provide a construction loan
for the entire development and therefore sought a participating bank
for construction financing of Phase 1.
Phase I was completed in 1989. Phase I consisted of 48 units in
total: 20 units were set aside for the BHA to purchase and rent, 20
units were HOP units and 8 were market-rate units. As of July,
1990, Phase I was 80% sold: 20 BHA units sold, 5 market-rate units
and 13 HOP units sold.
ABC bank provided the take-out loans for individual buyers.
According to the CDCs, CDC staff worked very hard to get applicants
through the process because there were many problems getting
applicants to qualify. Some of the problems identified by CDC staff
included:
1.) The ratios for the secondary market were not realistic.
They were paying 35-40% of their income for rent. This
surpassed the required 28% to qualify for
homeownership.
2.) Many were self-employed and their incomes fluctuated a
great deal.
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3.) Credit problems were an issue. Applicants did not have
any credit or they did not understand the importance of
knowing how to clean up their credit history.
CDC staff thought it was the downpayment that prevented many of
the applicants from buying, but there were broader issues that were
intangible.
The cost of the development was about $100-105,000 per unit, but
according to HOP limits, the sales prices were set at $80-85,000
per unit. According to CDC staff, "appraisals came in lower because
1.) HOP deed restrictions limited the return on equity and 2.)
preconceived notions about the value of property in Roxbury reduced
the values." 141  This helped the affordability of units, but hurt the
CDCs. According to the CDCs, the only one who made any money was
the bank.
Public Source-1 considered not funding Phase II (36 units) of the
development. Linkage funds were becoming tighter and the city was
reluctant to commit as much money as it did on Phase 1. The CDCs
had a commitment for HOP units, but due to the time lag, they will
have to reapply. Phase II was uncertain due to financing constraints
experienced by the city and the uncertain future of commercial
lending.
141 Telephone interview with CDC staff member; July 9, 1990, Boston.
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ABC Bank--Loan #2
Backaround
A city of Boston agency (agency) won a bid to purchase 16 buildings
containing 73 units of low-income housing from HUD. HUD sold the
property subject to a 15 year deed restriction which required the
owner to rent the units to tenants who qualified under HUD
guidelines. It was sold subject to $913,000 of renovations
completed within 12 months of the purchase date. The agency
applied for construction financing and a letter of credit from ABC
bank in 1988. The agency, a public entity which developed, owned,
operated, and managed low rent housing in the City of Boston.
Property
The property consisted of 16 buildings, containing 73 residential
units plus a vacant parcel of land. The buildings consisted of 100
year-old three and four story masonry row houses. The buildings
were assembled approximately 20 years ago for renovation into low
cost housing. However, since that time, the buildings had been
undermaintained and considerable deferred maintenance occurred.
The properties, located in the an urban neighborhood of Boston,
consisted of 9 studios, 20 one bedroom units, 16 two bedroom units,
15 three bedroom units, 7 four bedroom units, and 6 five bedroom
units. Sixty-five of the 73 units were, at the time of acquisition,
occupied by low-income tenants.
The Deal--ABC Bank's Perspective
The renovations were completed in two phases. In phase one,
renovations were completed on 28 occupied units and the eight
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unoccupied units were completed 12/31/88. Phase two consisted of
the completion of the remaining 37 units in the spring of 1989.
The total development budget for the project was $4,231,500.
Sources of funds included the following:
ABC Bank loan-construction/interim first mortgage $ 2,000,000
City agency equity $ 2,231,500
TOTAL $ 4,231,500
The project had a DCR of 1.23 and a LTV of 47%.
ABC bank provided a construction loan for $2,000,000 for 18 months
at prime plus 1%. This loan was converted to a permanent loan for
three years from the end of the construction loan. The rate on the
permanent remained at prime plus 1%. In addition, a Letter of Credit
was required by HUD to assure completion of the renovations. A
$913,000 letter of credit was provided to HUD during phase one of
the rehabilitation of the property. HUD had the right to draw upon
the Letter of Credit for three months after the period required to
complete the rehabilitation. The Letter of Credit had a maturity of
18 months from closing and the borrower paid prime plus 1%.
59
ABC Bank--Loan #3
Backaround
The borrowers were two individuals who operated a for-profit real
estate development and property management company conducting
business in Roxbury, MA. The individuals obtained a loan from ABC
bank to refinance an existing commercial building in Roxbury. The
borrowers were long-standing customers of ABC bank, since its
inception.
Propertv
The building was a two-story brick building with office and retail
space. It had 6,623 square feet of gross building area with 13 store
units leased at the time of loan closing. Tenants included a clothing
store, sub shop, record store, Big Brother Association, and a variety
of professional offices.
The Deal--ABC Bank's Perspective
The refinancing occurred in late 1980. The developers obtained
refinancing in the amount of $550,000 for three years at 13.5% fixed
rate. The $550,000 went toward paying off two outstanding loan
amounts, one to ABC and one to another Boston bank. $174,403 was
cashed-out of the deal and used for working capital and the
development of other property.
The individuals were required to personally guarantee the loan
amount. In order to ensure that the borrowers kept current on the
debt service payments, a late charge was agreed to as part of the
loan closing. The mortgage amount represented a loan-to-value of
66%. The debt coverage ratio was 1.05. The borrowers had a well-
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developed relationship with ABC bank, "a total banking relationship",
on both business and personal
accounts.
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4.2 XYZ BANK & TRUST COMPANY
XYZ Bank & Trust Company is a state-chartered bank regulated by the
state banking commission and the FDIC. Its holding company is
regulated by the Fed. Formed in 1960 in a Boston suburb, the bank
moved to Boston in the mid 1980s.
By definition, XYZ was a smaller lender. Its territory was local,
generally within 50 miles of Boston. The bank focused on what it
understood in terms of lending area; philosophy of issuing housing
loans based on the lenders' understanding of the area in which their
borrowers chose to live. According to an XYZ bank official,
"...lenders can understand why people live inside the Route 495 area,
but not in western Massachusetts. Therefore, the target area for
housing loans is between Boston and Route 495."142
XYZ established certain lending limits due in part to the experience
of other smaller, state-chartered banks which ran into trouble after
issuing loans based on 5 times capital to one loan. At XYZ, no
mortgage can be greater than 15% of capital to one loan, or 30% of
capital to one borrower. These limits protected XYZ from some of
the problems banks are experiencing today.
Loans in excess of $1 million had to be approved first by a bank
division head and then loan committee. As a part of the bank
approval process, loans were underwritten. The lender considered
the type of product, source and amount of equity, development and
marketing risk, and financing and credit risk. On average, XYZ loaned
at 1 1/2 points over prime on all types of loans.
The bank's portfolio was mixed including home mortgage loans (first
mortgages and equity loans), commercial real estate loans and
commercial business loans. At one time, during the peak of the
142 Telephone interview with bank official; July 3 & 6, 1990, Boston.
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bank's activity, nearly 20% of its portfolio was made up of CRA
loans.
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XYZ Bank--Loan #4
Background
Green Estates, a condominium development, was one of the first
projects initiated by the Public Facilities Department. The project
was also one of the earliest under the State's Homeownership
Opportunities Program (HOP) and among the first using Chapter 705
state subsidy program. According to PFD, it was a pathfinder on just
about every aspect.
The site, located in a Boston urban neighborhood, was formerly a
public building that was demolished about 10 years ago, but was
most recently, a vacant lot. A for-profit developer, Properties
Developer, was designated in mid 1980 to construct 24 attached
townhouse condominium units, made up of three-bedroom units.
Modular housing construction was used.
The Deal--XYZ Bank's Perspective
XYZ issued a construction loan for $2.1 million, or 80% of the
development costs, in the fall of 1986. The loan term was an
adjustable rate equal to prime plus 1 1/2 points for 1 1/2 to 2
years. A twelve month construction term was assumed for modular
housing development. The LTV was 80%, based on total costs.
Repayment of the loan was tied to individual unit closings.
Equity sources included a $200,000 Neighborhood Development Fund
loan from Public Facilities Department (PFD) and $172,500 from
Community Development Action Grant (CDAG) for infrastructure and
road work. According to the lender, the sources and uses did not
match. The bank looked to the property and the developer's personal
net worth and liquidity as collateral for the loan. The developer was
allowed a profit of $10,000 per unit.
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In reviewing this loan application, the lender looked at two things
first: 1.) the feasibility of the project in terms of its actual
completion and 2.) the commitment from the city. Since it was
manufactured housing, the lender looked carefully at the housing
manufacturer's ability to perform. Since the lender had done similar
construction loan deals with manufactured housing, there was no
perceived problem with its viability. The city contributed money in
two ways: 1.) equity towards the development deal and 2.) equity to
reduce the purchase price for the homebuyer.
The lender also evaluated the risks associated with the project,
including construction risk, marketing risk, credit risk, and
financial risk. Since the lender had previous experience with
modular housing construction, she knew what to expect. Some
aspects of the construction went slower than expected. The bank did
not disburse any loan funds until the unit was attached to the
foundation, so risk was minimized.
According to the lender, marketing proved to be the most difficult.
Since the majority of the units were under the HOP and the
remainder under MHFA's first time homebuyer program, the lender
expected the marketing to be quite easy. However, the lender did not
anticipate that the particular area in which the project was located
had a stigma due to recent shootings and drug-related crimes.
Credit and financial risk on the project had more to do with the
borrower than the project. The lender looked for personal
guarantees from the borrower because the development company was
just starting out. As a result, there was not an established company
behind the borrower and therefore, the trust itself was the property.
The bank minimized its risk by taking personal guarantees from the
borrower. The lender voiced some concern about the area. "You
couldn't do market-rate housing here.. .drug busts, some rif-raf, it's a
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scary area." 143 According to the developer, "you couldn't do market-
rate housing because you can't build a comparable house in the area.
The cost of construction was prohibitive." 144
Two out of the three buildings were completed in1987. The third
was finished in winter of 1989. All units were sold by summer,
1989. According to the lender, the project was completed late and
repayment of the loan was late. According to the general contractor,
the project was completed late due "to the relative experience of
the contractor." 145
Developer's Perspective
Properties Developer began it operations in the mid 1980s, in
residential development, particularly affordable housing. The target
area of their developments were in Roxbury, Dorchester, South End,
and Cambridge. In the late 1980s, Properties Developer diversified
its operations into retail. Currently with a small full-time staff,
Properties Developer has $80 million worth of assets.
Green Estates was one of their first ventures. They worked closely
with the neighborhood residents in order to come up with plans that
were acceptable. The neighborhood wanted three-bedroom units, eat-
in kitchens, washer/dryer hook-ups, and unfinished attics. The
developers incorporated these items into the plans.
There was a belief that if you offered a low mortgage rate with less
than a $5,000 investment, there would be a lot of people wanting to
purchase a home. The area in which Green Estates was located was
already a depressed area which normally had problems with crime
143 Ibid.
144 Telephone interview with project manager; July 30, 1990, Boston
145 Ibid.
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and drugs. Due to the attractiveness of the product and the low
mortgage rate, it was believed that these barriers could be
overcome. Several market studies were produced which showed
sufficient incomes and interest to purchase a home by the families
already living in the area. Even though there existed a problem with
crime and drugs, most families remained in their neighborhood.
According to the developer, the biggest marketing problem was the
availability of eligible purchasers who could meet the state and city
guidelines. The developer was very successful in locating families
for the development in light of these constraints. 146
According to the project manager, things went smoothly with the
bank until homebuyers needed take-out loans. It was difficult to get
applicants through the process. "There were so many restrictions,
income, family size, etc., that it was difficult to get someone
qualified." 147 The project manager described walking applicants
through the entire process in order to get them qualified. This took
a great deal of time.
Due to the delays in construction and sales, the project got caught in
the softening of the condominium market of late 1988. The bank
began to get scared as the market softened, unit sales slowed, and
repayment from unit closings were delayed. The bank eventually got
repaid. The developer achieved its intended goal of helping the
revitalization of this depressed area. 148
146 Ibid.
147 Personal interview with project manager; July 3, 1990, Boston.
148 Telephone interview with project manager; July 30, 1990, Boston.
67
4.3 TOWNBANK
Townbank is a commercial bank regulated by the OCC. By definition
it is a large bank with its main office is located in downtown
Boston.
Townbank's Department of Government and Community Affairs was
responsible for relationships with government agencies, community
development groups, and private developers pursuing projects with a
high level of community reinvestment significance. Townbank was
active in the Neighborhood Development Program, a city program
started in the late 1970s, designed to help small businesses and
commercial properties in neighborhoods by lowering the cost of
borrowing to encourage revitalization by lowering interest rates.
Townbank was a leading bank in the program during the mid 1980s.
The Neighborhood Development Program drew upon banks' credit
judgement and resources to offer borrowers 2/3 to 3/4 of the base
rate. The city limited the banks' rate exposure by depositing money
into the bank on which no interest was required. The amount
deposited was calculated to lower the interest rate to make it
affordable to the project (7-8%).149 The compensating balance
deposited by the city yielded no interest to the city and therefore
was compensation to the bank and served as a vehicle for the bank to
pass on the savings to the borrower. The city's deposit was not in
any way a guarantee or collateral for the bank's loan to the
borrower. 150
Townbank had special resources to deal with non-traditional type
loans. While all loans were expected to meet the traditional
underwriting criteria of the bank, through the Department of
149 Telephone interview with former director of NDEA; June 26, 1990, Boston.
150 Telephone interview with bank official; June 26, 1990, Boston.
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Community Affairs, some non-traditional loans were reviewed with
greater emphasis on social purpose and city commitment.
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TOWNBANK--Loan #5
Background
The Blueskies Building, a rehabilitation of a building into artist
lofts and commercial space, came to Townbank through a non-profit
developer (CDC) in cooperation with and assisted by PFD. The
project was considered, by the bank, to be an non-traditional loan
with a multiplicity of funding sources. Included in the funding
sources was a first mortgage from Townbank, a second from
Community Development Finance Corporation, and a third from PFD.
Property
In mid 1980, the project involved the purchase, rehabilitation and
mixed-use development of the Blueskies Building in a Boston urban
neighborhood. The 20,000 square foot, four-story building was left
vacant, except for a 2,000 square foot Major Drug Store. The
remaining 18,000 square feet of commercial space was vacant for
many years.
The non-profit developer (CDC) and Major Corporation proposed a
partnership to develop the project. Under the agreement, Major Drug
Store leased the new, 4,400 square foot first floor for 15 years.
The three upper floors were converted to ten condominiums: 8 artist
workshop/lofts, one rental, and one office. The 11,460 square feet
of upper floor space was redeveloped and leased for five years with
an option to purchase.
The Deal--Townbank's Perspective
The deal was brought to Townbank by many socially-minded lenders
and investors, including PFD, CDFC, the non-profit developer, and
other city agencies. The bank found comfort in the deal due, in part,
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to the players' experience and the commitment demonstrated by all
involved. The people involved were " people who would work
together if a crisis arose.. .who were comfortable enough to
subordinate their interests..."1 51  There was public interest and
popular support for the project. "The numbers alone for this deal
were not enough; you have to show commitment and hope that in a
crisis situation, people would work to solve the problem." 152
Once introduced to the bank through the Community Affairs
Department, the loan followed the traditional route through the bank.
The real estate division gave the loan the "normal" review, including
the evaluation of the following:
1.) Value of the property, using the market and income
approach of valuation.
2.) Projected cash flow, including the carrying costs for all
debt and operating costs. (Debt coverage ratio of 1.2 was
sought, but this loan had a DCR of 1.1).
3.) Capacity of the developer.
4.) Capacity, experience and soundness of documentation of
architects, engineers, and contractors.
5.) Evaluation of real estate in terms of amount of risk and
exposure of the bank.
This particular loan was of interest to Townbank due to the
commitment of funding from the city and CDFC as well as the fact
that Major Drug Store signed a long-term lease for the entire first
floor of the building. Leases for the artists lofts were not in hand
at the time of loan closing, however, the bank was comfortable with
the amount of interest demonstrated once the artist market had been
identified.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
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The loan went to loan committee for final approval. Once approved,
a letter of commitment was sent to the borrower with conditions of
the loan transaction. The bank's main condition was that all other
funding sources be available and ready to go before loan closing.
Sources of Funds:
Townbank $ 200,000
Equity-L.P. $ 175,000
CDFC $ 50,000
City Block Grant $ 200,000
Non-Profit $ 50,000
TOTAL SOURCES $ 675,000
Developer's Perspective
The non-profit developer (CDC) was incorporated in the late 1970s
through the efforts of three neighborhood civic associations in a
Boston urban neighborhood. The CDC was formed to "address the
problems of economic disinvestment, deterioration and abandonment
of housing stock, the drastic decline in the area's only commercial
center, a general lack of public works and high unemployment
levels." 153
In order to get financing for the Blueskies building, the non-profit
developer had to appeal to the Department of Community Affairs at
Townbank. According to a member of the CDC staff, no other bank
would consider their loan package. Townbank was the only bank that
let them in the door and stuck with them throughout the process. 154
Other financial institutions did not want to lend any money. The
153 "Summary", Development Package Submitted to Bank by CDC, 1983, 13.
154 Telephone interview with director of CDc; June 27, 1990, Boston.
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developer even approached banks with CRA problems to offer them
the opportunity to remedy some of the problems, but they said "no
thanks". Townbank told the developer to secure other sources of
funding first. The developer went to the city and CDFC.
According to the director of the CDC, the bank wanted "the first born
son". 155 The bank wanted Major Drug Store to sign a 25 year lease
and made this a condition of the loan. The bank also wanted artists
to commit to a 5-year lease for the loft space. The developer felt
this was an absurd request given that the artists generally had no
money. 156 In addition, the developer had to raise $175,000 by
syndicating the historical tax credits. It took a year to put the
whole thing together.
According to CDC staff, there was a lot of talk about DCRs, but
"basically it boiled down to what Townbank was willing to lend.
They finally said they would not go over $200,000. CDFC chipped in
and PFD came up with the balance.. .Whatever it needed to be to make
the project affordable.. .There was no equity, no coverage.. .We were
just trying to break even. It was an uneconomic project in the first
place." 157 According to the director of the CDC at the time of the
deal, traditional underwriting criteria was not used in this deal. "I
don't think you could check off a half dozen [underwriting criteria]
that were standard." 158
Recently, CRA issues are more and more evident in the newspapers,
but it is not making it any easier to obtain financing. The CDC is
currently trying to get end loans for the artist lofts and finding it
difficult because, afterall, these are the mortgages the banks have
to hold in their portfolios. 159
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
158 Telephone interview with former director of CDC; July 2, 1990, Boston.
159 Telephone interview with director of CDc; June 27, 1990, Boston.
73
5.0 ANALYSIS
This chapter provides an analysis of the case studies within the
context of bank underwriting criteria provided in chapter three. It
also provides conclusions regarding whether or not the five loan
transactions described in chapter four would be processed and
approved in the 1990s. Finally, chapter five closes with a
discussion of how the Boston experience is generalizable to other
cities throughout the country.
Non-traditional lending differs from traditional lending in several
ways. The way in which non-traditional loans are underwritten is
the focus of this analysis. As defined earlier, non-traditional loans
are defined as loans issued in disinvested urban areas with
underwriting criteria used which strays from traditional
underwriting criteria.
While traditional lending places emphasis on profit, non-traditional
lending places priority on the benefits to the community. As seen in
the case studies, the numbers alone do not make these types of deals
work, there needs to be a strong commitment from the city, as well
as creative ways to structure the loan transactions. The non-
traditional process adds a step to the 'normal' credit review in order
to identify and direct public enhancement to fill the financial gaps
and provide comfort to the lender. 160 For the purpose of this study,
level of comfort is defined as the mitigation of risk to a point where
the lender is comfortable enough with the loan package that its
approval by loan committee is likely. In these cases, it is used in
reference to the private lender sharing the risk with the city.
The five loan transactions were issued on properties located in
Boston urban neighborhoods which historically suffered from
160 C.P. Line and C.E. Riesenberg, Principles and Practices of Community Development
Lending: A Five Step Investment Model to Strengthen Bank Community Development
Programs, 4-1.
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disinvestment. Each bank made a decision to invest capital into
these neighborhoods, placing greater emphasis on social
responsibility than profit. While ABC bank had an on-going
commitment to lending in these neighborhoods and long established
relationships with many of its borrowers, XYZ and Townbank had
less history of lending in these neighborhoods. All five loans
involved a tremendous time commitment by both the lender and the
developer due to the complexity of the deal structure and, as well
as, in some cases, the inexperience with non-traditional type loans
on the part of the developer, the lender, or both.
Many of the Boston lenders interviewed in this study indicated that
the underwriting criteria used did not differ depending on whether
the loan was considered traditional or non-traditional. In fact, many
lenders interviewed stated that they do not substitute criteria in
order to process non-traditional loans. If a loan package does not
meet standard requirements in terms of DCR, LTV, equity, and
personal guarantees, the loan is not approved. In particular, the
three banks who provided information for the case studies made
similar statements. However, as evidenced in all five case studies
presented, each lender exercised flexibility in substituting
traditional underwriting criteria for non-traditional underwriting
criteria to process these loans. Examples of flexible underwriting
criteria include calculations of public sources of financing as equity
or income, reduced DCR requirements in exchange for personal
guarantees, or approval of loans despite little or no equity from the
borrower.
Larger banks, such as Townbank, expressed more conservatism in
approaching non-traditional loans than smaller banks, such as ABC
and XYZ banks. However, in the final analysis, the larger bank and
the smaller banks underwrote non-traditional loans exercising a
similar amount of flexibility in substituting criteria. In all cases,
for example, the lenders acknowledged and accepted public sources
of financing as either equity or project income. Sources included
grants, subsidies, linkage payments, and loans from public and
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quasi-public entities. As demonstrated in four of the five loan
transactions, these sources increased the feasibility of the projects
and provided a level of comfort to the lender. The strong financial
commitment provided by the city, in case studies #1, 2, 4 and 5,
minimized the risk for the banks.
As described in chapter three, lenders look for minimum
requirements in terms of the numbers on traditional loans.
Generally, lenders look for no greater than an 80% LTV based on the
project's appraised value. This percentage may decrease if a project
is considered risky. The equity required varies depending upon the
amount of the LTV, but equity percentage should make up the
difference. The DCR also varies depending on the project and the
borrower. DCRs range from 1.15 to 1.25 depending on the amount of
risk associated with the projects' potential cash flow. 1 61
The loan transactions described in the case studies illustrated the
flexibility with which non-traditional loans are underwritten. For
example, in case study #3, the loan was underwritten with a DCR of
1.05. In exchange for the lower DCR, the developer was required to
personally guarantee the loan amount. Case study #5 had an LTV of
29.6% and a DCR of 1.1. In this case, the borrower put up a large
portion of equity, so the banks' risk was minimized. While the other
case studies had ratios which fell within the traditional range,
developers were required to personally guarantee the loan amounts,
or there was enough financial support from the city to provide a
level of comfort necessary for the lender to process the loans.
Three of the five developers came to the lending institutions with
either little or no equity or commercial credit history. For example,
in case study #4, the development deal was one of the first by the
developer and therefore the development company had little track
record and no commercial credit history. As a result, the lender
1 61 Kollias, "Community Development Lending: Cutting Edge for Good Business", 20.
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required personal guarantees and public sources of funding in place
at the time of loan closing. Case studies #1 and 2 illustrated loans
to non-profit developers with little or no equity. In each case, the
lender found comfort in the public commitment demonstrated by the
city and the commitment of the non-profit developer.
The dilemma for the commercial lender in a situation where the
borrower does not have 'deep pockets' and there is no history of
commercial credit is the lack of recourse should the loan go into
default. In the case of non-traditional loans, as seen in the case
studies, the properties were located in areas of perceived higher
risk and lower values. Therefore, banks did not necessarily want the
property should default occur. However, as demonstrated in the case
studies, with strong financial commitment from the city, lenders
perceived their risk to be shared and therefore gained comfort in
lending.
According to bank lenders in Boston, it is unlikely that the five loans
issued between 1986 and 1989 would be issued in the 1990s. One
reason is that as a result of FIRREA, the minimum standards for
underwriting loans has become much stricter. Lenders are losing
some of the flexibility needed to underwrite non-traditional loans.
Due to the stricter standards and the rigor in which examiners are
reviewing bank loans, many lending institutions will not be in a
position to issue real estate loans. Furthermore, many banks are
being ordered to reduce the percentage of real estate loans in their
overall portfolio.
Another reason for the decline in non-traditional lending centers
around diminishing public funding sources. As presented in the case
studies, a central element in all of the loan transactions was the
financial commitment of the city. Each lender indicated that the
city commitment essentially made the deals viable from the bank's
perspective. As these sources of funding disappear, these types of
loans will be increasingly more difficult to process.
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The city of Boston has demonstrated a strong commitment to the
reinvestment of capital into certain urban neighborhoods by
providing equity and project income to individual development
projects. This is illustrated in the case studies and through city
initiatives aimed at enhancing lending opportunities in areas of
Boston suffering from disinvestment. In addition, community
organizations have played critical roles advocating and
implementing many of the programs designed to combine public and
private resources. The end result has been the formation of several
local, city, and state groups and forums organized to address the
lack of affordable and available financing in inner-city
neighborhoods of Boston.
While some banks have responded to the credit needs of inner-city
neighborhoods by creating programs providing construction loans for
community development projects, banks must consider longer term
financing in these neighborhoods. Banks must maintain a presence to
further promote increased quality of life by making long-term
commitments to the economic stability of these areas by
establishing permanent loans, home mortgage loans, and a physical
presence that fosters relationships. It is important to note that the
Fed must come forward and take a stronger role in setting
requirements for lending which would encourage banks to issue
longer-term loans.
There has been increasing pressure from CRA and through city of
Boston initiatives to issue non-traditional types of loans in
disinvested areas of Boston. At the same time, however, increased
regulation has created an environment where lenders are
apprehensive about issuing real estate loans, particularly loans
perceived as risky. The affects of the two opposing pressures are
yet unknown. However, the Fed is purported to begin meeting with
CRA regulators in order to mitigate any potential negative impacts
of these pressures. Several bank officials in Boston indicated that
Boston banks will not fulfill their CRA obligation unless they can
meet the safety and soundness and compliance regulations. On the
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other hand, some lenders and industry experts stated that the only
real estate loans that will be issued in Boston in the future will be a
result of legislative pressure and city initiatives. This dilemma
must be resolved if the problems of inner cities are to be addressed.
In order to replicate the Boston experience, four key components
must exist. First, there must be a strong commitment of the city,
the banking industry, and local developers to reinvest in inner-city
neighborhoods which have historically suffered from disinvestment.
Second, there must be a combination of public and private funding
sources available to provide revolving loan pools for construction
and permanent financing of affordable housing and commercial
properties as well as home mortgage loans in inner-city
neighborhoods. Third, community organizations must work in
partnership with the city and banking industry in order to implement
city initiatives similar to those in Boston. Fourth, banks must be
willing to underwrite non-traditional loans with flexibility
including reduced interest rates, reduced closing costs and fees, and
alternative sources of equity sources.
There does not exist an art or a science to underwriting loans.
Although models for underwriting criteria exist, projects need to be
analyzed and packaged individually. Each brings to the table a unique
set of factors that must be addressed. Lenders evaluate loan
packages based on different assessments of risk, bank policies and
willingness to be flexible. Therefore, much of underwriting is
subjective. The flexibility used in substituting underwriting
criteria in order to process loans which foremost benefit the quality
of life and economic stability and potential growth of inner-city
communities is an essential element in any reinvestment strategy
proposed by the Fed, CRA regulators, and other key actors.
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